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The research question of this thesis is “how can Nokia’s lobbyists influence EU decision-making?” Nokia is 
used as a case study. We can assume that Nokia can lobby the EU in several ways. Therefore, the question 
focuses on the “how.” The goal is to study Nokia’s EU lobbying model. The material consists of articles, a 
study and books, as well as e-sources and interviews. With regard to Nokia, the material is subjective. The 
company of Nokia was chosen for this thesis because Nokia is both a global and Finnish company. It is a 
success story and a source of pride for Finns. Telecommunication and mobile technology are interesting 
sectors because they represent fast-growing industries. Nokia established an EU office in Brussels in 1993. 
Nokia’s head of the EU office explains that their main goal is to monitor the EU’s legislative activities, 
provide expertise to EU institutions and perform advocacy. Nokia’s EU office also supports Nokia whenever 
possible, e.g. with EU grants or project funding. For Nokia, the central EU lobbying channels are the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and Nokia’s own EU office. The findings of the interviews 
seem to be well in line with the theory. Both emphasised the use of EU institutions in EU lobbying. 
Theorists drew attention to associations. Companies can use e.g. BusinessEurope or other business 
associations to lobby the EU. This research can also be modified to a deeper level, and Nokia’s EU lobbying 
model can be used by other companies or industries as well.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. MOTIVATION OF TOPIC 
 
The research question of this thesis is “how can Nokia’s lobbyists influence EU decision-making?” Nokia is 
used as a case study. Nokia can lobby the EU in several ways. Therefore, the question focuses on the 
“how.” The goal is to study Nokia’s EU lobbying model. The material consists of eight interviews, articles, a 
study, books, PowerPoint slides (Corporate EU lobbying, how to lobby effectively? Kaisa Olkkonen, Nokia, 
2014) and several e-sources. Books of Nokia’s history were also read by Häikiö, Ollilla and Siilasmaa (Häikiö, 
2002; Ollila & Saukkomaa, 2013; Siilasmaa, Fredman & Päkkilä, 2018). The Nokia material is subjective.  
Why Nokia?  
The company of Nokia was chosen for this thesis because Nokia is both a global and Finnish company. It is a 
success story and a source of pride for Finns. The telecommunication and mobile technology sectors are 
interesting because they represent fast-growing industries. I got the idea for this thesis when attending an 
EU lobbying seminar organised by the European Parliament’s information office in Helsinki (2015). There, 
Kaisa Olkkonen demonstrated how Nokia lobbies in the European Union. Nokia established an EU office in 
Brussels already in 1993. Nokia’s head of the EU office has explained that their main goal is to monitor the 
EU’s legislative activities that can affect Nokia, provide expertise to EU institutions and perform advocacy. 
Nokia’s EU office also supports Nokia whenever possible, e.g. with EU grants or project funding.  
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1.2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
  
The topics of this thesis, such as EU lobbying and Nokia, can be studied from various angles. Hence, the 
following scholars are included.  
Klüver, Braun & Beyers (2015) and De Bruycker (2015) have studied interest groups in EU legislative 
lobbying. Dür, Bernhagen & Marshall (2015) ask “when does business win and when does it lose in the 
context of legislative policy-making in the EU?”  
Three EU institutions as EU lobbying channels are presented. First, Coen & Richardson (2009) and 
Greenwood (2011) study lobbying the European Commission. Secondly, Kluger (2015), Hauser (2011) and 
Coen & Katsaitis (2015) discuss the European Parliament as a lobbying venue. Also, lobbying activities 
towards the Council are given a short presentation by Greenwood and Hauser.  
Associations are discussed. For example, Greenwood has brought up BusinessEurope and the European 
Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) as examples of EU business associations. Additionally, Kohler-Koch, 
Kotzian & Quittkat (2017) have studied national and international business interest associations (BIAs). Two 
examples of BIAs are the Confederation of Finnish industries (EK) and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). Nokia receives help from all these associations.  
Corporate lobbying in the European Union is discussed by Bouwen (2015) and Tenbücken (2002). Bouwen 
introduces access goods, which can give access to EU institutions. For example, Nokia can offer expert 
knowledge (EK). Tenbücken has researched the EU lobbying strategies of multinational companies (MNCs). 
The orthodox strategy is introduced. Nokia is used in this example on account of it being an MNC. 
Finally, Kautto (2009) has published an article, “Nokia as an Environmental Policy Actor: Evolution of 
Collaborative Corporate Political Activity in a Multinational Company”.  In the article, Kautto investigated 
three cases of environmental policy preparation: 1) the RoHS/ WEEE Directives;  2) the EuP Directive; and 3) 
the IPP pilot project on mobile phones, in which Nokia was active during the preparation of all the 
directives.  
The theoretical material is objective, since it looks at EU lobbying from a general perspective. Kautto has 
not worked at Nokia.  
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1.3. EU DECISION-MAKING 
New decisions are being constantly made in the EU. As the process is not well known, I will clarify it.  
Firstly, before proposing laws, the European Commission (EC) estimates their possible economic, social or 
environmental effects. This happens by conducting Impact Assessments, which look at the advantages or 
disadvantages of the options.  
Additionally, the EC usually consults non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local authorities and 
representatives of industries and civil society. Various experts provide guidance to the EC on technical 
issues. Hence, the EC guarantees that legislative proposals respond to the needs of those with the most 
concerns.  
Businesses, citizens and organisations can participate via the website or other venues for public 
consultations.  
 
  
(You and Europe.) 
 
Negociations = negotiations 
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Kenealy, Peterson and Corbett (2015) have explained the EU decision-making. It is based on the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Here is a short summary: 
 
 The Commission produces a draft of the legislation and sends it to the Parliament and the 
Council for viewing. 
 
 The Parliament and Council discuss the draft separately and may propose changes.  
 
 If a specified majority in each institution reaches agreement, the proposal is accepted.  
 
 If an agreement has still not been reached between the Council and Parliament, a conciliation 
committee is convened to find a compromise. 
 
 If no agreement can be reached at this stage, the proposal is rejected. 
 
(Bomberg, Peterson & Corbett, 2015: 122) 
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The following EU institutions are central in EU decision-making and will be studied in this thesis. Their tasks 
are presented here.   
1. COMMISSION 
 
 
(European Commission.) 
 
Proposes laws for EU legislation. The European Commission’s political leadership consists of 28 
Commissioners. Administrative work is undertaken by its staff, which is organised into departments 
called the Directorates-General (DGs). The DGs each handle a particular policy area. Before proposing 
new laws, the Commission makes impact assessments, which examine the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of the law proposals. Requests and input from the public or stakeholders can be 
made via public consultations. (European Commission.) 
 
2. PARLIAMENT 
 
 
(European Parliament.) 
 
The European Parliament works in two main stages: A) Committees and B) Plenary sessions.  A) 
Committees: the Parliament has 20 committees and two subcommittees. They each take care of a 
specific policy area. Committees prepare legislative proposals. In the committees, MEPs and political 
groups can suggest amendments or reject bills. B) Plenary sessions: EU legislation is passed during the 
plenary sessions. MEPs gather at Strasbourg to vote on the proposed legislation. (European 
Parliament.) 
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3. COUNCIL 
 
 
 
The Council of the European Union is discussed here. It is the voice of the EU member countries. It 
adopts EU laws and coordinates EU policies. The members of the Council are government ministers 
from each EU country. They handle different policy areas.  (Council of the European Union.) 
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1.4. NOKIA 
 
WHERE IT ALL STARTED 
 
Nokia has a fascinating history. It goes like this: A Finnish engineer named Fredrik Idestam founded a wood 
pulp mill in Southern Finland in 1865. Having seen the possibility of an increased demand for pulp products, 
he opened another mill on the river of Nokianvirta. This inspired him to name the company Nokia AB. 
During the 1960s, Nokia was involved in several businesses, including rubber, cable, forestry, electronics 
and power generation.  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND MOBILE PHONES 
 
(Nokia Corporation.) 
Things changed. European telecommunications were faced with deregulation in the 1980s. At this time the 
GSM (global system for mobile communications) was introduced. The very first call using a Nokia phone 
was made in 1991. Subsequently, Nokia decided to focus on telecommunications and mobile phone 
technology while divesting its other businesses. By 1998, Nokia was the world’s leading mobile phone 
company. This success continued over a decade.  
 
 
 8 
 
 
NOKIA SIEMENS NETWORKS AND MICROSOFT 
In 2007, Nokia, together with Siemens Network, created a joint venture (combining telecoms infrastructure 
operations). A few years later, Nokia bought the share of Siemens in NSN. Then Microsoft came into the 
picture. This happened in 2011. The main reason for these actions was because Nokia wanted to bolster 
their position in the smartphone business.  
ALCATEL-LUCENT 
Purchasing Alcatel-Lucent has made Nokia the forerunner for innovating new technology and services. This 
has been strengthened by Bell Labs (research). 
NOKIA TODAY  
My case study regards the current Nokia:  
1. TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS AND SERVICES. 2. HEALTH CARE SOLUTIONS. 3. LICENCES AND 
PATENTS. 4. BELL LABS (RESEARCH).  
 
HERE YOU CAN SEE HOW NOKIA HAS DEVELOPED. 
 
(Nokia Corporation.) 
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1.5. THESIS OUTLINE  
 
This part explains the structure of the thesis. There are five chapters. Chapter 1 contains the introduction. 
There, the research question, case study (Nokia), previous research, EU decision-making and Nokia are 
presented. Chapter 2 is the theoretical part. This part explains EU lobbying, interest groups, the 
Commission, Parliament and Council as lobbying venues, business associations, corporate lobbying and, 
finally, Nokia as an EU actor. Chapter 3 discusses the method and research material. Chapter 4 is the 
analysis, where the results from the interviews are compared with theoretical findings. Chapter 5 concludes 
the results of this thesis and discusses future research.  
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2. THEORY 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This is the theory of the thesis. It presents the findings of various scholars. The topics are EU lobbying, using 
the Commission, Parliament, Council and associations as EU lobbying channels, corporate lobbying of 
multinational companies and Nokia as an EU actor.  
 
2.2. EU LOBBYING 
 
This part explains EU lobbying. Lobbying can be defined in various ways.  
Hauser has defined it as the following: “Lobbying is generally defined as the attempted or successful 
lobbying of legislative-administrative decisions made by public authorities through the use of interested 
representatives.” (Hauser, 2011: 682)  
This thesis uses this definition.   
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Hauser has also presented the history of EU lobbying. There are two paths, the “national route” and 
“Brussels lobbying,” that can be recognised. They are presented here.  
 
A. NATIONAL ROUTE (1957-1987) 
This route includes using national channels, such as the Council or permanent representation of EU 
member states (COREPER), for example. Following the 1957 Treaty of the European Community (TEC), 
European interest groups mainly lobbied Brussels, targeting member state governments and leveraging 
unions, trade organisations and professional associations to access national representatives. This was due 
to the European Community's weak political mandate and the ability of member states to veto legislation in 
the Council of Ministers. Recognising this participatory deficiency, the Commission's 1988 Cecchini Report 
sought active participation from business interests in EU governance. 
 
B.  BRUSSELS LOBBYING (1987-1999)  
The 1987 Single European Act (SEA) was the first revision of the TEC, establishing Europe's goal of a single 
market. Hence, lobbying activity shifted from national to European channels. Hence, the Commission 
estimated that by 1992 there would be over three thousand active public and economic lobbies in Brussels. 
"Where power rests," argued political scientists, and "lobby is brought to bear.” The Europeanisation of 
lobbying was led by economic integration and the increasing role of the EU. With the SEA and 1993 
Maastricht Treaty, national governments moved regulatory functions to European institutions, expanding 
the EU’s competencies in the single market, product quality, health, safety, employment, competition law, 
environmental standards, industrial policy and consumer protection. Demanding access to Europe's 
policymaking process grew as EU institutions showed significant competencies. Additionally, Maastricht 
broadened policy domains so that the Council could make decisions via qualified majority voting (QMV) 
(Hauser, 2011). 
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2.3. INTEREST GROUPS 
 
This section deals with interest groups in EU legislative lobbying. Several researchers have studied this 
topic. Interest groups can be companies, for example.  
De Bruycker (2015) explains that interest groups supply information to policy-makers, which develops an 
expertise-based relationship between the two groups. He conducted 143 interviews with lobbyists who 
were active in making 78 legislative proposals sent to the European Commission. In general, information 
can be seen as a ‘currency’ in expert-based relationships. Policy-makers face complicated problems and 
therefore they search for expertise. They lack relevant information on the policy proposals and have little 
time to gather the data. This is why policy-makers need to use external sources such as interest groups 
(Broscheid and Coen, 2007; Chalmers, 2011; Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Van Schendelen, 2010). 
Figure 2.3.1. describes the mean predicted probabilities of supplying technical and political information by 
various interest groups. Those that make contact with the European Commission have a mean probability 
of 0.75 (S.E. =0.01) (standard error) for offering technical information, and the ones that target the 
Parliament have a probability of 0.51 (S.E. =0.02). The validity of the finding (technical information) will be 
further investigated. De Bruycker concludes that interest groups mostly supply technical information in EU 
legislative lobbying. 
FIGURE 2.3.1. (De Bruycker, 2016: 611) 
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Dür, Marshall & Bernhagen (2015) have researched interest group success. They ask “When does business 
win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policymaking in the EU?” Business interests aim to 
constantly lobby public policy in the EU. For example in 2012 and 2013, internet companies such as 
Facebook and Google massively lobbied the EU institutions in order to make changes to a data protection 
directive. According to the authors, business actors in the EU tend to lose out when seeking to accomplish 
desired policy outcomes. To a large extent, EU legislative proposals handle market regulations, which 
businesses generally oppose. Hence, businesses rise up in opposition whenever the European Commission 
publishes new proposals for legislation (Dür, Bernhagen & Marshall, 2015).  
 
Moreover, Klüver, Braun & Beyers (2015) have studied interest group lobbying in the European Union. The 
authors took part in the INTEREURO project. Essentially, as the authors claim, some legislative proposals 
are simple and clear, while others are complex as they deal with extremely technical matters. Therefore, 
the European institutions constantly seek external expertise due to the small amount of staff they have 
compared to the EU’s policy competences. Usually, interest groups that are experts in their fields are 
welcomed. What is interesting is that the authors expect that the size and resources of policy-specific 
lobbying coalitions have important consequences for EU interest group politics (Baumgartner et al., 2009; 
Bunea, 2013; Klüver, 2013a, 2013b).  
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2.4. COMMISSION  
 
The European Commission is a central EU lobbying institution. Coen and Richardson (2009) have found that 
“early lobbying” applies especially to the Commission, because it sets the agenda of the EU legislative 
process (Gardner, 1991:65; Nonon and Clamen, 1991; Hull, 1993:82; Buholzer, 1998:276; Majone, 1994). 
The Commission exercises its powers by implementing and supervising EU policies. The Commission wants 
to be in contact with lobbyists because it needs external resources to execute its institutional role. In order 
to comprehend how private interests lobby in the Commission, it is important to understand the exchange 
relation between the Commission and private interests (Bouwen, 2002:368). Private interests can be 
companies. External expertise is necessary when the Commission is drafting legislative proposals. Lobbyists 
can have access to the Commission if they can provide expert knowledge on specific policy proposals.  
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Table 2.4.1. shows the lobbying activity of interest groups in the Commission’s Directorates-General (DGs). 
We can see that business interests mostly contact the Enterprise DG (currently DG GROW). It develops 
policies in business and industry. This is a significant place for companies to lobby (Coen & Richardson, 
2009).  
COMMISSION AND INTEREST GROUPS  
TABLE 2.4.1. (Coen & Richardson, 2009: 24) 
 
Humanicarian = Humanitarian (ECHO) 
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COMMISSION AND CIVIL SOCIETY  
The European Commission engages with civil society and its individual components, like companies, for 
example. Greenwood (2011) has described this interaction:  
 Briefing of all legislative initiatives in a yearly work programme. 
 
 A consultation plan is published. The consultation can be open or expert groups, workshops and 
forums can be used. 
 
 The consultation plan is part of a larger impact assessment, which is based on legislative proposals. 
This makes the process transparent. All the evidence used for the drafting of the proposal is shown. 
The evidence becomes the basis for a public debate, where interested participants can take part. 
Often, organisations make their own impact assessments. During this process, the evidence is 
challenged and the key concepts of the legislative proposal become clearer. 
 
 A Green Paper represents a ‘thinking aloud’ instrument of consultation. When it is done, a White 
Paper consults details of the policy options. 
 
 Finally, the last legislative proposal from the Commission contains a statement, which describes the 
consultation procedures taken. This includes a presentation of the responses given. It should also 
have the Commission’s own responses, which show why a particular decision was made or ignored. 
 
(Greenwood, 2011:34) 
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2.5. PARLIAMENT 
 
The European Parliament is also relevant in lobbying. Hauser (2011) stresses that the Parliament has 
become a central lobbying venue. It does not have a “built-in majority,” which has resulted in coalition-
building and consensus decision-making. Every year 70,000 individuals contact the European Parliament. 
However, many meetings between MEPs and lobbyists are confidential.  MEPs search for industry expertise 
due to the complex issues that the Parliament deals with. According to an Italian MEP, lobbyists can supply 
information to the MEPs in a “clear fashion.”  
 
PARLIAMENT AS A LOBBYING VENUE 
FIGURE 2.5.1. (Hauser, 2011: 696) 
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Kluger (2015) has examined business lobbying in the European Parliament. She argues that the Parliament 
has become a central lobbying venue due to its increased regulatory powers. Her goal is to research the 
conditions that help business groups shape Parliament’s policy outcomes. In order to accomplish this, she 
has conducted a comparative case study design on four recent legislative dossiers, conducted process 
tracing of EU documents, looked at lobbying letters and done 145 interviews. Kluger emphasises that the 
greatest lobby belongs to the powerful MEPs (rapporteurs). They take on a leadership role in their own 
political group on specific dossiers. When lobbying, interest groups must take into account all MEPs that 
are “foes, friends or fence-sitters” (Marshall, 2010). (Rasmussen, 2015) 
The European Parliament (2015) has published a study on special interest representation written by 
Katsaitis and Coen. They confirm that the Parliament is being increasingly lobbied. The data of the study is 
based on an email survey. For example, MEPs were asked: “How often are you contacted by different types 
of groups?”  
Chart 2.5.2. explains this. We can see that the European Parliament is frequently or very frequently 
contacted by companies (52%).  
CHART 2.5.2. (Coen & Katsaitis, 2015) 
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2.6. COUNCIL 
 
Greenwood (2011) has studied the Council. He argues that the Council is an institution where no lobbying 
takes place. The Council sees to it that contacts with lobbyists and NGOs is taken care of by the European 
Commission. The committee of permanent representatives, or “COREPER,” can be a useful lobbying target. 
Finland has a Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels; e.g. Nokia can contact them if 
necessary. Contrary to the Commission and Parliament, the Council needs less information from private 
actors. This is because it can receive information from national and local governments instead. Finally, 
integrating “fresh input” is difficult at the end of the EU decision-making’s cycle. This decreases the powers 
of the Council as a place to lobby. During the time when proposals come to the Council, only a small 
amount of issues can be debated (Greenwood, 2011). 
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2.7. ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Various associations such as BusinessEurope and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) can help 
companies influence EU decision-making. Nokia uses both of the aforementioned associations.  
They are presented here.  
 
BUSINESSEUROPE 
 
(BusinessEurope.)  
BusinessEurope is the leading organisation for growth and competitiveness at the European level. It works 
for companies in Europe and campaigns for entities that centrally lobby their business. BusinessEurope 
speaks for all-sized enterprises in 35 European countries.  
ERT 
 
(The European Round Table of Industrialists.) 
The European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) brings together 55 chief executives and chairmen of 
multinational companies with a European parentage. The ERT handles a wide range of industrial and 
technological sectors.  
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Associations can be business associations, for example. Greenwood (2011) has presented EU business 
associations.  
From table 2.7.1. we can see that BusinessEurope spends 50% more on lobbying than the ERT.  
EU BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
ORGANISATION BUDGET EXPENDITURE ON 
LOBBYING 
NUMBER OF 
STAFF 
AMCHAM-EU €2,217,000 €400,000-450,000 23 
BUSINESSEUROPE Undisclosed €550,000-600,000 45 
ERT Undisclosed €300,000-350,000 7 
EUROCHAMBRES Undisclosed ≥€ 1,000,000 27 
UEAPME €1,643,200 €1,561,000 32 
TOTAL  €3,811,000 134 
TABLE 2.7.1. (Greenwood, 2011: 76) 
 
UEAPME = THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION OF CRAFT, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
AMCHAM-EU = AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
EUROCHAMBRES = ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY  
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BUSINESS INTEREST ASSOCIATIONS (BIAs) 
There are also national business interest associations (BIAs). Kohler-Koch, Kotzian and Quittkat (2017) have 
studied these. One example of a BIA is the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), with whom Nokia 
works. The article of Kohler-Koch, Kotzian and Quittkat tests hypotheses grounded on a dataset regarding 
BIAs from France, Germany, Poland and the UK. According to the analysis, BIAs that have a good financial 
capability (such as BusinessEurope), a sufficient level of representativeness and multisector capabilities 
have the best probability of access to the EU. For example, the organisation called ICC (International 
Chamber of Commerce) has a good level of representation. Nokia is active at ICC Finland. Importantly, the 
more that BIAs can offer information to decision-makers, the easier it will be to gain access to them. The 
authors make an interesting argument: The larger the domain of the association is, the likelier it is that it 
can offer general information on economic policy effects and present broad views on behalf of the business 
world. However, associations that represent only certain sectors are less able to offer this, but they can be 
specialised in technical knowledge, however (Kohler-Koch, Kotzian & Quittkat, 2017). 
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In the following passages, the ICC and EK are given a short description.  
ICC 
 
ICC Finland is one of the 90 national committees of the global ICC network. They aim to work for the 
interests of their members in order to facilitate international trade.   
EK 
 
(Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto.) 
The Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) is the leading business organisation in Finland. The EK works 
daily with EU institutions such as the Commission, Parliament and Council of the European Union. It wants 
to ensure that the voice of Finnish companies is heard in EU decision-making. The EK monitors and 
influences EU regulatory projects that affect businesses.  
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2.8. CORPORATE LOBBYING  
 
Multinational companies (MNCs) like Nokia influence EU decision-making. This can be called 
corporate lobbying.  
Tenbücken (2002) has researched the EU lobbying strategies of MNCs. One of these is the “orthodox 
strategy,” which is described in chart 2.8.1. The chart has been modified by me, and the examples of Nokia, 
the EK, ERT and BusinessEurope are added.  
 
THE ORTHODOX STRATEGY  
 
 
 
      
 
     
                  
                   
        
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                  
CHART 2.8.1. (Tenbücken, 2002: 128) 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATIONS (EK) 
EURO-GROUPS 
(BUSINESSEUR
OPE & ERT) 
 
NATIONAL 
MINISTRY 
MULTINATIONAL 
COMPANY (NOKIA) 
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
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Bouwen (2002) has also studied corporate lobbying in the European Union, and in his research he 
introduces the concept of “access goods.” These are goods which can provide benefits to EU policy-makers 
and grant access to EU institutions for supplier companies. According to Bouwen, expert knowledge (EK) is 
an access good that includes expertise and technical know-how. This is crucial information for effective EU 
legislation. He emphasises that EU member state administrations do not have this kind of expertise. They 
do have technical know-how, but they are “too far away from the market.” Nokia can probably offer 
“expert knowledge (EK).” 
There are three access goods: 
1. Expert Knowledge (EK) 
2. Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI) 
3. Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI) 
 
(Bouwen, 2002) 
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2.9. NOKIA AS EU ACTOR 
 
This part studies Nokia as an environmental policy actor in the European Union. It is one example 
of Nokia’s EU lobbying.  
 
Kautto (2009) has studied three cases of environmental policy preparation: 1) RoHS/ WEEE Directives; 2) 
the EuP Directive; and 3) the IPP pilot project on mobile phones. Nokia was active in the preparation of all 
the directives.  
 
Kautto found that Nokia’s staff participated in the European Commission’s meetings and workshops. 
NOKIA’s “top management” was in close contact with European Commissioner Erkki Liikanen and his 
cabinet (DG ENTR). The contacts with the cabinet were well used by Nokia, the European industry 
associations and other MNCs like Hewlett-Packard, IBM and Philips. They collaborated with Nokia to gain 
access to the cabinet. In addition, bilateral meetings were held between Nokia and the Commission. These 
were organised with a particular purpose of finding a consensus within industry associations. This 
collaboration continued during the co-decision procedure of the Council and the Parliament. Interestingly, 
the first reading in the European Parliament was made by the rapporteur Astrid Thors, a Finnish MEP. In 
fact, her previous assistant had worked for Nokia’s EU office in Brussels. Kautto concludes that Nokia chose 
to use several channels instead of one as a way of lobbying the EU, with the main venue being the EICTA 
(European Information and Communication Technology Association). Currently that venue is 
DIGITALEUROPE (Kautto, 2009). 
 
SUMMARY OF NOKIA’S EU ACTIONS: 
- Early acting.  
- Multi-level lobbying.  
- Lobbying the European Commission. 
- Constructive feedback.  
- Ad hoc coalitions.   
- Personal contacts with the Commission.  
(Kautto, 2009: 121) 
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RoHs /WEEE Directives = Restriction of Hazardous Substances / the Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment 
EuP Directive = the Energy Using Products  
IPP pilot project = Integrated Product Policy 
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2.10. CONCLUSION OF THEORY 
 
We can conclude that, according to the theory, the following EU lobbying channels are the most 
central ones: 
 
1. COMMISSION: The Commission wants to be actively in contact with lobbyists, because it needs 
external resources. External expertise such as the use of companies is necessary when the 
Commission makes legislative proposals.  
 
2. PARLIAMENT: The Parliament is a central lobbying venue because it has extensive regulatory 
powers. Companies should contact the powerful MEPs, or “rapporteurs.”  
3. ASSOCIATIONS:  BusinessEurope and the ERT can help companies with influencing EU decision-
making or accessing EU institutions. BusinessEurope speaks for all-sized enterprises in 35 European 
countries. The ERT also brings together 55 chief executives and chairmen of multinational 
companies with European parentage and handles a wide range of industrial and technological 
sectors. Nokia works closely with both associations.  
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3. METHOD AND RESEARCH MATERIAL  
 
3.1. CASE STUDY 
 
The case study method is presented here. It is widely used in social sciences. Yin (2003) has examined case 
study research methods. According to him, every research strategy has advantages and disadvantages. 
They depend on the following things: a) the type of research question, b) the investigator’s control over 
events, and c) a focus on contemporary phenomena. Usually, the case study method can answer the 
question of “how.” In this, the researcher has little control over events and is focused on a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real-life context. To Yin, the case study is a strategy that contributes knowledge 
about groups as well as social and political phenomena. Here, the groups can mean companies.  
According to Yin, the following are central to case studies:  
(1) The study question.  
(2) Proportions.  
(3) Unit of analysis.   
(4) Logic of linking the data to proportions. 
(5) Criteria for interpreting results.   
For this thesis they are:  
(1) How can Nokia influence EU decision-making?  
(2) “How” and “EU decision-making.”  
(3) Nokia.  
(4) Categories.  
(5) Analysis.  
(Yin, 2003: 21) 
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3.2. DATA 
 
The research material (data) consists of eight interviews along with the perspectives of scholars who 
specialise in the topics. The interviews were conducted face-to-face or by Skype in 2016 and 2017. The 
transcribed interviews can be seen in the appendices. I chose to conduct interviews because an interview is 
interactive communication with people. For me this was the best method to conduct the research.  
There are several forms of interviews. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) have studied qualitative research 
interviewing. To them, an interview is a conversation that has a structure and meaning. One of these forms 
is “interviews with elites,” which in my case suits best. Elite interviews are made with leaders or experts. 
This thesis used leaders from Nokia and other expert institutions (the EU and University of Helsinki). Kvale 
and Brinkmann emphasise that an elite’s thoughts are best interviewed through a conversation when an 
interviewer has previous knowledge of the topic. This happened in my case as well. I had studied Nokia and 
EU decision-making before I started the interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
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3.2.1. INTERVIEWEES 
 
The interviewees are described in this chapter. Their identities were kept anonymous. They are referred to 
as P1, P2, P3, P4, P8, P5, P6 and P7. Their workplaces and tasks are presented here: 
 
NOKIA  
P1 = previous EU representative 
P2 = head of EU office 
P3 = head of governmental relations  
P4 = worked as Nokia’s EU advisor 
P8 = previous head of EU office 
EU 
P5 = European Commission 
P6 = European Parliament 
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI 
P7 = EU researcher 
 
3.2.2. SAMPLING  
 
These persons were chosen for the interviews because they are leaders or experts in their field. Few of 
them were previously familiar to me. 
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3.2.3. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
The interview questions are presented here. They are semi-structured, meaning they are open and broad. 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) have studied semi-structured questions. The authors argue that these 
questions usually aim to provide a meaning to a certain phenomenon. In this thesis the meaning of “how” is 
studied. However, there are also challenges with open and broad questions. I noticed that it leads to 
extensive answers. It can be difficult to find the relevant information for your research question. Despite 
this, I believe that open questions provide space for spontaneity. For this reason also, categorising was 
chosen as a method to logically divide the results from the interviews and theory (these are explained in 
Chapter 4 “analysis”) (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
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This figure illustrates the interview questions:  
 
 
   
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOKIA 
HOW CAN NOKIA 
INFLUENCE EU DECISION-
MAKING? 
P1, P2, P3, P4, P8 
EU 
HOW CAN COMPANIES 
INFLUENCE EU DECISION-
MAKING? 
P5, P6 
 
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI 
HOW CAN ASSOCIATIONS 
HELP COMPANIES LOBBY 
THE EU? 
P7 
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4. ANALYSIS  
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This is the analysis of the thesis. In order to accomplish this, I have chosen categorising, because it is used in 
the case study method. All the answers of the interviewees and scholars are placed in their respective 
categories. The aim is to find answers to the research question “how can Nokia influence EU decision-
making?” Categorising helps me receive consistent results. The same logic is used for every category. First, 
the interviewees’ answers are studied, followed by those of the theorists. Finally, both answer groups are 
compared and the main conclusions are reached. In total, there are five general categories which all 
companies can use to lobby the EU. Since the case study of this thesis is Nokia, Nokia’s EU lobbying model 
is studied at the end of the analysis (section 4.7.).  
 
4.2. CATEGORIES  
 
These are the general categories which were chosen because they are the most relevant EU lobbying 
channels based on theory and interviews.  
4.3. COMMISSION 
4.4. PARLIAMENT  
4.5. COUNCIL 
4.6. ASSOCIATIONS 
4.7. EXPERTISE INFORMATION SHARING 
 
4.8. NOKIA’S EU LOBBYING 
This is not a category. Instead, it presents how Nokia lobbies the EU.  
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4.3. COMMISSION  
 
SUMMARY. To P5, P1, P2, P3, P4, P8, De Bruycker (2015), Coen & Richardson (2009) and Kautto (2009), the 
European Commission is a central lobbying venue. P7 and De Bruycker have found that the Commission 
requires technical information from lobbyists because the Commission prepares EU directives. As the issues 
that policy-makers face are complex, relevant expertise and know-how is needed from the industry. The 
Commission also lacks the necessary time for gathering data, hence the use of external sources such as 
interest groups. These can be companies, for example. According to P3 and Kautto, the European 
Commissioners are helpful when lobbying. Coen & Richardson and P5 noted that the Commission’s 
Directorate-Generals (DGs) have high political power and hence should be lobbied.  
Nokia and the Commission are studied in section 4.8.1.  
DGS/CABINETS. P5 explains that the Commission should be lobbied before Parliament, since the 
Commission formulates laws. To P4, all lobbying should happen early in the process, meaning usually a year 
in advance. P7 emphasises that the Commission appreciates technical knowledge.  
Coen & Richardson (2009) argue that the Commission wants to be in contact with lobbyists because it 
needs external resources. This expertise is necessary when the Commission is drafting legislative proposals. 
Additionally, the Commission consults various private interests to receive broad views in order to ensure its 
legitimacy as well as support for its legislative proposals. They also use committees when formulating 
policies. The committees have become an important venue for private interests. Importantly, the 
Commission’s DGs often communicate with private interests (Mazey and Richardson, 1997:183; Nugent, 
2001:108; Christiansen, 2006:108). Table 2.4.1. by Coen & Richardson (presented in Chapter 2 “theory”) 
shows that businesses mainly contact the Enterprise DG (today DG GROW), which develops policies in 
business and industry. This is a significant place for companies to lobby (Coen & Richardson, 2009).   
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Interestingly, De Bruycker (2015) has made 143 interviews with lobbyists who have been actively making 78 
legislative proposals sent to the European Commission. The result was that, in general terms, information 
can be seen as ‘currency’ in expert-based exchanges. The Commission does not possess the relevant 
information for the policy proposals. Because they also have little time to gather the needed data, they are 
driven to use external sources such as interest groups (Broscheid and Coen, 2007; Chalmers, 2011; Dür and 
De Bièvre, 2007; Van Schendelen, 2010). Figure 2.3.1. in theory describes the predicted probabilities of 
supplying technical and political information by various interest organisations. Those that make contact 
with the Commission will most probably offer technical information (De Bruycker, 2016). 
Kautto (2009) studied Nokia’s activity in the preparation of the RoHS/ WEEE Directives, the EuP Directive 
and the IPP pilot project on mobile phones. He learned that Nokia participated in the European 
Commission’s meetings and workshops. Most importantly, Nokia’s “top management” was in close contact 
with the Finnish European Commissioner Erkki Liikanen and his cabinet. Nokia and the Commission also 
held bilateral meetings (Kautto, 2009). 
 
4.4. PARLIAMENT  
 
SUMMARY. P6, P8, P2, P4, P3, P7, Kluger (2015), Hauser (2011) and Coen & Katsaitis (2015) agree that the 
European Parliament is a central venue for lobbying. As Kluger emphasises, this is due to Parliament’s 
increased regulatory powers, among other things. The greatest lobby belongs to the powerful MEPs 
(rapporteurs). Coen has argued that the Parliament needs technical information in a similar fashion as the 
Commission, because MEPs need to understand topical issues and problems very broadly. Coen & Katsaitis 
have found that 52% of companies contact the Parliament.  
Nokia and the European Parliament will be studied in Chapter 4.8.2. 
MEPs. According to P6, the European Parliament is an important lobbying channel. Companies should 
consider the Parliament’s role in the “right way and time.” Overall, companies should think about how they 
bring out their opinion and ideas for better regulation regarding e.g. competition positions or 
improvements for internal markets. If companies find clear faults in existing EU laws, as for example in the 
case of Nokia, they should reveal these flaws to Finnish MEPs. Hence, when the EU laws are being drafted, 
the fresh ideas of the companies won’t be new to stakeholders. This is called the pre-lobbying phase, 
where the Parliament is central. Therefore, this phase is crucial for effective lobbying.  
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The next phase is the preparation of EU laws. Though this work mainly belongs to the Commissions, the 
Parliament’s role should not be forgotten in this phase either, because it can affect the type of preparations 
that are made. Overall, companies should contact MEPs and Parliament’s specific committees. “Bargaining 
chips” should be put forth in the Parliament, since the Commission usually looks at the pre-phase of EU 
law-making. For companies, it is important to understand how EU decision-making is done. For example, 
multinational companies either have the know-how or they can hire the necessary expertise.  
According to P7, roaming charges, among other issues, has been a difficult topic to explain. Various 
stakeholders see that this is true. To lobbyists, MEPs only understand how much one costs by x and y 
amounts. There is a targeting problem here, as lobbyists seek to lobby yet cannot turn their lobbying into 
an understandable language. P7 explains that there is an assumption that the Commission needs more 
technical information and MEPs need it less. Hence, for companies, it is easier to contact the Commission 
and citizen organisations. However, David Coen has argued that it is not exactly so. Today, the Parliament 
has become an important actor in the legislation process and they also need technical information. Usually, 
Commission officials work on certain topics, while MEPs have to understand various problems broadly. P7 
questioned whether MEPs have the resources to accomplish such a thing.  
 
4.5. COUNCIL 
 
P3, P2, P1, Greenwood (2011) and Hauser (2011) mentioned the Council. Greenwood has emphasised that 
the committees of permanent representatives (COREPER) can be a useful channel for lobbying, as they can 
raise significant issues for the Council of Ministers, which needs less information from private actors. 
Hauser argues that the European Council is the conciliator of disputes and makes strategic decisions on 
Europe’s future. Together with the Parliament, the Council has “veto power” on legislation by co-decision 
and can finalise the EU’s budget (Greenwood, 2011; Hauser, 2011).  
Nokia and the Council are studied in section 4.8.3. 
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4.6. ASSOCIATIONS 
 
4.6.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This category is broad because there are national, European and global associations. A few examples of 
business associations such as BusinessEurope, the ERT, ICC and EK are presented in Chapter 2 “theory”. 
Associations can help companies influence EU decision-making.  
SUMMARY. P1, P4, P8, P2, P7 and Greenwood (2011), Kohler-Koch, Kotzian & Quittkat, Klüver (2017) and 
Braun & Beyers (2015) consider associations to be central in EU lobbying. Greenwood has mentioned the 
European business associations BusinessEurope and ERT. From table 2.5.1. (presented in “theory”), we can 
see that BusinessEurope spends 50% more on EU lobbying than the ERT. Additionally, BusinessEurope 
conducts everyday lobbying while the ERT focuses on strategic matters. According to Kohler-Koch, Kotzian 
& Quittkat, the national business associations (BIAs), with their good financial capability, level of 
representativeness and multisector capabilities, have the best access to the EU. Kohler-Klüver, Braun & 
Beyers argue that it is usually interest groups that are experts in their fields that are welcomed. Klüver adds 
that those interest groups which belong to a bigger lobbying coalition have a better chance to influence EU 
decision-making (Greenwood, 2011; Klüver, Braun & Beyers, 2015; Kohler-Koch et al., 2017). 
P7’s empirical analysis studied multinational chemical companies and interviewed their Heads of European 
Affairs. These companies could be compared to Nokia. P7 asked them how much they collaborate with 
other chemical companies. Surprisingly little, was the answer. P7 added that “If I represented a chemical 
company, I would try to create coalitions with others.” P7 contacted BusinessEurope. The European 
Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) was also singled out.  Finally, P7 asked the question “When the legislation 
has been conducted, what is the role of Nokia? Is it lobbying through DIGITALEUROPE?” P7 also mentioned 
Eurooppanuoret. Nokia could use their help as well.  
EUROOPPANUORET RY (JEF FINLAND) 
 
(Eurooppanuoret ry (JEF finland) 
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P8, P2 and P1 say that associations such as BusinessEurope, the ERT and DIGITALEUROPE are important for 
Nokia. BusinessEurope and the ERT are presented in Chapter 2 “theory”.  
 
DIGITALEUROPE  
 
(DIGITALEUROPE – the voice of digitally transforming industries in Europe.) 
 
Nokia and associations are studied in section 4.8.4. 
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4.7. EXPERTISE INFORMATION SHARING  
 
P7 discovered that expertise required for lobbying is highly challenging. 
MNCs. Tenbücken (2002) explains that multinational companies (MNCs) which lobby the EU often have EU 
public affairs staff helping them monitor political developments. Nokia, for example, has its own EU office 
in Brussels. Early stage involvement is important, especially when the Commission is drafting the initial 
proposals. The Commission wants to act objectively, and MNCs use Euro-associations to avoid strict 
regulations (Tenbücken, 2002). 
Bouwen (2002) argues that expert knowledge (EK) includes expertise and technical know-how. This is 
crucial information for effective EU legislation. To him, EU member state administrations do not have 
technical expertise. They do have technical know-how, but they are “too far away from the market” 
(Bouwen, 2002). 
Dür, Marshall & Bernhagen (2015) have argued that in the EU, business actors on average tend to lose out 
when seeking to accomplish desired policy outcomes. Generally, business actors oppose EU legislative 
proposals on market regulations. Hence, businesses rise up in opposition whenever the Commission 
publishes new proposals for legislation (Dür et al., 2015). 
Expertise information sharing is central in Nokia’s EU lobbying model. Nokia utilises their expertise in 
various ways. This is described in section 4.8.5.  
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4.8. NOKIA’S EU LOBBYING 
 
4.8.1. NOKIA AND COMMISSON   
Based on the interviews, Nokia utilises the Commission in a remarkable fashion. In the opinion of P4, one 
should lobby the Commission early. Before a law proposal comes up, the Commission is thinking about it, 
making consultations, outlining different options and making impact assessments of these options. This is 
quite necessary in order to understand the gravity of the issue. In this, stakeholder groups such as the civil 
society (e.g. companies) and NGOs are important in the process. P4 explains that this is the time to get 
organised and collect all the available data and evidence that there is. Policy-makers need this information 
in order to see how the proposals impact society, economy and public health. Interestingly, P2 thinks that 
“real good decision-making” only happens if the Commission is well informed. The Commission needs to 
know what is happening in the industries they want to address. Hence, they consult players such as 
businesses. For example, if the Commission introduces rules on data protection, Nokia will want to be the 
best in that particular area and accordingly applies principles such as accountability.  P2 also stresses that 
since the Commission develops law proposals, it is important to talk to them in an early stage (usually a 
year in advance). This way, lobbying is easier.  
P1 adds that the Commission can also be approached directly. P1 emphasises that the EU legislative 
process starts when the Commission publishes a Green Paper. Interested parties are then invited to submit 
comments. As a rule, the Commission does not deal with specific company issues, as the Commission 
prefers to receive position papers submitted by organisations representing the industry.  
Finally, P3 notes that the Estonian Commissioner, Andrus Ansip, who is responsible for the EU’s Digital 
Single Market, has been helpful in understanding the “Nordic view.” 
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4.8.2. NOKIA AND PARLIAMENT  
For Nokia, the Parliament is also an important EU lobbying channel, but in a different way than the 
Commission. MEPs play a key role for Nokia, and Nokia needs to work with the ones who are relevant. The 
following information summarises Nokia’s answers regarding the Parliament. P4 explains that Nokia has 
been following the Parliament for a long time and knows the MEPs well regarding matters of copyright or 
frequency. There are many MEPs who understand these issues and together they form the Parliament’s 
opinion for these matters. The political element must also be taken into account. Arguments must be 
constructed on a European framework. Companies cannot tell MEPs arguments that only support the 
companies’ own interests; they must also provide arguments that benefit the whole European industry or 
competitiveness. P4 states that the Parliament’s agenda must be followed; the earlier you act, the better it 
is, and it is central to find the MEPs that have the “pencils in their hand.”  
P3 mentioned that the Finnish MEP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri works with the roaming issue. P3 also 
describes lobbying as producing data and understanding it. With regard to MEPs, there is a general concept 
that lobbying is something unclear. However, this is not true. It is more about telling clear messages and 
making good policies.  
To P2, it is not easy to explain one’s views to a large audience. To ease up the process, there are 
rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs in the Parliament. Nokia cannot talk to every MEP; it has to search for 
the relevant MEPs of its field.  
 
4.8.3. NOKIA AND COUNCIL  
The results show that, for Nokia, the Council is not that relevant in EU lobbying. However, Nokia works with 
Finland’s Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels (COREPER). P1 says that they have 
many experts in various fields. P3 also mentioned COREPER and other national channels for lobbying (see 
e.g. chart 2.8.1. in “theory”). 
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4.8.4. NOKIA AND ASSOCIATIONS  
Based on the results, business associations are a remarkable lobbying channel for Nokia, and the company 
uses them broadly. Nokia has not only used associations, it has been actively creating new ones. According 
to P8, if daily presence is not possible, one has to be active in one’s own European “umbrella” association. 
Nokia actively works with DIGITALEUROPE, BusinessEurope, ERT, EK, ICC Finland and the European Digital 
Media Association (EDiMA).  
To P4, one must think about the message you want to convey and find the right group for doing that. Once 
the message has been found internally within the expert group, it has to be taken to the trade associations. 
Usually, groups aim to make a proactive proposal together. Also, P2 says that trade associations are 
important for Nokia. It serves as an additional channel for them, where Nokia can introduce their interests 
and they can hear various viewpoints from others.  
To P4, all channels are important in order to have a coordinated position between many organisations. At 
least one year before the proposal is put in place, companies gradually move towards the trade and 
industry associations to defend the position of the industry and make the company’s message the 
prevailing one. The messages have to include the stake for innovation, economic development, 
environment and social aspects. P4 emphasises that, in general, the message is more effective when it is 
sent through the “big channels,” which will provide more impact.  
According to P1, when seeking to enhance the voice of the EU electronics industry, the Nokia office was 
instrumental in merging several EU associations for telecom, consumer electronics and components into 
one association: The European Information and Communication Technology Association (EICTA). Nokia 
participated in the board of the association and in many working groups. EICTA was later renamed 
DIGITALEUROPE. P2 also says that it is always good to discuss and have a joint position on important 
matters. 
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4.8.5. EXPERTISE IN INFORMATION SHARING 
Nokia is an industry leader in telecommunications and uses this position when influencing EU decision-
making. Bouwen (2002) presented the concept of “expert knowledge” (EK). Nokia can truly offer this to EU 
institutions such as the Commission and Parliament, particularly with regard to technical matters.  
4.8.6. EU OFFICE 
According to P1, deregulation of the European telecommunication industry started in the 1990s. 
Competition rules were also implemented at this time, which was challenging to Nokia and its competitors. 
To follow up more closely on the liberalisation of the telecom industry, Nokia established its EU office in 
Brussels in 1993. Having an office of your own is one of many options when lobbying the EU. As the 
legislative process in the EU usually takes years, establishing a company office in Brussels may therefore be 
justified. It is obviously not the cheapest alternative, but – in combination with other means – it may be the 
most efficient one. Ideally, for an EU representative, it is important to know the industry in question, the 
company you work for and how the institutions of the EU function. A background of technical and/or legal 
studies is obviously helpful. A key instrument for the EU Office was Nokia’s large database for Commission 
papers, association position papers and other relevant documents. Nokia could then quickly access 
information and forward it. 
4.8.7. OTHER NOKIA-SPECIFIC EU LOBBYING FACTORS 
P1 says that Nokia has participated in an EU research programme. In the 1990s, Finland was regarded as 
the “laboratory of the telecommunication industry.” Hence, Nokia was often consulted in various telecom 
issues. P1’s role often involved finding the key issue-owners within Nokia and getting them to participate in 
hearings in Brussels. Nokia also prepared a number of written opinions. The Nokia positions were regularly 
discussed at the Head Office in meetings with a ”Future Watch Team” consisting of experts from all 
divisions. After a few years in Brussels, Nokia added another secretary and two issue managers to focus on 
copyright matters and consumer and environment policy. Altogether, P1 spent ten years representing 
Nokia in Brussels. P3 says that Nokia invites several partners to Finland to whom they offer data on ICT 
matters. Often, Finland can show a good example, and usually the “Finnish voice” wants to be heard. 
Though Nokia’s home is in Finland, Nokia is not Finnish. The message of the company must be directed to 
everyone. It must be clear and right. To P3, “lobbying is about communicating.” It is a task that must bring 
value to the audience, which comes “on top of the data.” P2 emphasises that Nokia wants to do good and 
be a sustainable company. Nokia wants to be really on top. It wants to make sure that the EU provides 
common rules that make sense. 
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4.8.8. CONCLUSION 
 
This section has explained Nokia’s EU lobbying model. Based on the results, these entities are the most 
relevant to Nokia, in order of importance:  
1. COMMISSION 
- Nokia is utilising the Commission in a remarkable fashion. 
- “Real good decision-making” happens only if the Commission is well informed. 
- The Commission needs to know what is happening in the industries they want to address. 
Therefore, they consult players such as businesses. For example, if the Commission introduces 
rules on data protection, Nokia will want to be the best in that particular area and accordingly 
applies principles such as accountability.   
- The Commission develops law proposals, and therefore it is important to talk to them in an 
early stage. This way, lobbying is easier. 
- The Estonian Commissioner, Andrus Ansip, who is responsible for the EU’s Digital Single 
Market, has been helpful in understanding the “Nordic view.” (P3) 
- Former Finnish European Commissioner Erkki Liikanen has been important to Nokia.  
 
 
2. PARLIAMENT 
- MEPs play a key role for Nokia and Nokia needs to work with the relevant ones. 
- Companies cannot tell MEPs arguments that only support the companies’ own interests; 
companies must also provide arguments that encourage the whole European industry or 
competitiveness. 
- The Parliament’s agenda must be followed; the earlier you act, the better it is, and it is 
central to find the MEPs that have the “pencils in their hand.” 
- The Finnish MEP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, who works with digital and technology issues, is 
important to Nokia.  
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3. EU OFFICE 
- Nokia has an EU office in Brussels.  
- Nokia can work closely with the European Commission, European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union. 
- The office helps Nokia follow EU legislation activities close by.  
- Nokia can provide expertise to the EU institutions.  
- The EU office can find EU grants or project funding for Nokia. 
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5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
 
5.1. SUMMARY 
 
The chapters of this thesis will be revised shortly.  
Chapter 1 is the introduction, where the thesis topic is explained. The research question “how can Nokia 
influence EU decision-making?” and the case study of “Nokia” is explained. Additionally, previous research, 
the EU decision-making process and Nokia’s story is presented. The thesis structure is also clarified.  
Chapter 2 is the theory, which presents the findings of scholars on EU lobbying and interest groups, with 
the European Commission, European Parliament and Council of the European Union examined as lobbying 
routes, in addition to describing business associations, corporate lobbying and Nokia as an EU actor.  
Chapter 3 shows the method and research material. It describes the chosen research method, which 
combines the case study “Nokia” and interviewing. The categorising of the results is described. The 
research material “data” includes eight interviews and findings of scholars who are specialised in the topic. 
Chapter 4 analyses the interview results and compares them with theoretical perspectives.  
Chapter 5 is the conclusion of the research question. Other possible options and future research are 
discussed in this chapter.  
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5.2. FINDINGS 
 
These conclusions are based on theory and the results of the interviews.  
Based on the analysis, no clear controversies can be found between scholars and case study interviews. 
Though both emphasise the role of the Commission and Parliament, the importance of associations and 
own EU office was not stressed in the theory. These two channels are important for global high tech 
companies like Nokia, which operate in a highly regulated industry.  
The justification for the order of importance is the following: 
1. COMMISSION 
The European Commission is the most relevant lobbying venue. The Commission requires technical 
information from lobbyists because of its role in proposing EU legislation. As the Commission lacks the time 
to gather data, it needs external sources like companies. European Commissioners can be helpful when 
lobbying. The Commission’s Directorate-Generals (DGs) have a lot of political power and should therefore 
be lobbied. When lobbying the Commission, the companies must contact them early enough before the 
legislative proposals go further to the Parliament and Council.    
2. PARLIAMENT 
The European Parliament is an important lobbying venue because of the Parliament’s increased regulatory 
powers. As a lobbying channel, the Parliament is second to the Commission. Due to the Commission’s role 
in drafting proposals, it might be too late to start lobbying the Parliament if one wants to influence 
legislation. This is valid especially in the case of Nokia. Like the Commission, the Parliament needs technical 
information because MEPs have to understand issues and problems very broadly. According to statistics, 
52% of companies contact the Parliament. This number is clear evidence that the Parliament is an 
important lobbying channel. If companies can see clear faults in existing EU laws, as e.g. in the case of 
Nokia, they should reveal those flaws to the relevant MEPs. Hence, when the EU laws are being drafted, the 
fresh ideas of the companies won’t be new to stakeholders. Companies should also contact Parliament’s 
specific committees. “Bargaining chips” should be put forth to the Parliament, since the Commission usually 
looks at the pre-phase of EU legislation. Though there are contradictory aspects to Parliament’s role as a 
lobbying channel, its legislative powers have increased since the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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3. ASSOCIATIONS  
Associations are a significant EU lobbying channel. This channel is third in importance after the Commission 
and Parliament on account of those entities being direct lobbying channels, which means that they cannot 
be ignored. Associations are an indirect lobbying channel representing various members. For example 
BusinessEurope and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) can help companies with EU lobbying. 
BusinessEurope uses roughly 50% more expenditure on EU lobbying than the ERT.  
The national business associations (BIAs), with their good financial capability, level of representativeness 
and multiple sectors, have the best access to the EU. One example of a BIA is the Confederation of Finnish 
Industries (EK), which works closely with EU institutions. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is 
also well represented globally. Those companies which belong to a bigger lobbying coalition have a better 
chance to influence EU decision-making. 
5.3. NOKIA 
This section represents the relevant EU lobbying channels for Nokia. These conclusions are based on the 
interviews with Nokia:  
1. COMMISSION 
Nokia utilises the Commission strongly. It seems that Nokia does not ignore the Commission, and therefore 
it is the most important EU lobbying channel for the company.  Here is a strong argument from one 
interviewee: “Real good decision-making happens only if the Commission is well informed.” The 
Commission needs to know what is happening in the industries they want to address. Therefore they 
consult players such as businesses; for example, if the Commission introduces rules on data protection, 
Nokia will want to be the best in that particular area and accordingly applies principles such as 
accountability. Since the Commission develops law proposals, it is important to talk to them in an early 
stage. This way lobbying is easier. Another interviewee mentioned that the Estonian Commissioner Andrus 
Ansip, who is responsible for the EU’s Digital Single Market, has been helpful in understanding the “Nordic 
view.” Erkki Liikanen also aided Nokia greatly in working within the EU. 
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2. PARLIAMENT 
The Parliament is also a strong channel, but it comes second to the Commission. MEPs play a key role for 
Nokia and the company needs to work with the relevant ones. Companies cannot tell self-serving 
arguments to MEPs that only support the company’s own interests. They must provide arguments that 
encourage the whole European industry or competitiveness. The Parliament’s agenda must be followed; 
the earlier you act, the better it is. It is central to find the MEPs that have the “pencils in their hand.” The 
Finnish MEP Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, who works with digital and technology issues, is important to Nokia.  
 
3. EU OFFICE 
It is uncommon for all companies to have an EU office. Nokia, on the other hand, has dedicated resources 
to focus on EU lobbying and they accordingly have an EU office in Brussels. Because of this, Nokia can work 
closely with the Commission, Parliament and the Council. The EU office helps Nokia follow EU legislation 
activities up close. Hence, Nokia can provide local expertise to the EU institutions. Nokia’s EU office can 
search for EU grants or project funding for Nokia. 
 
4. OTHER NOKIA ASPECTS 
Nokia collaborates with associations such as BusinessEurope, the ERT and DIGITALEUROPE.  
The following quotes present other aspects:  
- “Lobbying is about communicating. It is a task that must bring value to the audience, which comes 
on top of the data.” (P3) 
- “Nokia wants to be a sustainable company and really on top. It wants to make sure that the EU 
provides common rules that make sense.” (P2) 
Nokia places great importance in offering technical expertise in EU decision-making and it is one of the 
leading actors in ICT and mobile technology.  
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5.4. FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
5.4.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The topics of this thesis were broad. When considering future research, some narrowing of the topics could 
be done with the research question. For example, in this thesis only one EU institution, the European 
Commission, could be thoroughly studied. This is because the Commission seems to be the most relevant 
EU lobbying channel in this particular research, as e.g. Nokia works closely with the Commission. This is 
relevant to the EU lobbying of research companies, which are a central interest group in the EU decision-
making.   
 
5.4.2. METHOD  
 
The method of case study and interviewing was useful for this research. However, it would have been 
possible to condense the interview questions. The questions could be a mixture of multiple choice and 
standard questions. This could make it easier to categorise and compare the findings. The interviews could 
also be shorter, with a maximum allotted time of 15-30 minutes, because the transcription process is quite 
slow. The more data you have, the more it takes time to search for the essential answers and conclusions.  
 
5.4.3. OTHER IDEAS  
 
Other companies could make use of this thesis and its results, like start-up or environmental technology 
companies, for example. The structure of this thesis could be used. If companies study this thesis, they 
could choose the focus areas adapted to their industry.  
Even though this thesis focused on Nokia, the findings appear to be relevant for many other companies as 
well. The size and industry of the company determines its EU lobbying model.  
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APPENDICES 
EU:  
 
HOW CAN COMPANIES INFLUNCE 
EU DECISION-MAKING? 
 
NOKIA:  
 
HOW CAN NOKIA INFLUENCE EU 
DECISION-MAKING? 
 
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI:  
 
HOW CAN ASSOCIATIONS HELP 
COMPANIES INFLUENCE EU 
DECISION-MAKING? 
 
P6: “The Parliament is one 
channel of lobbying. (Companies) 
should consider the Parliament’s 
role in the right way and time.” 
 
P4:   
These are central according to 
her:  
1) How to organise yourself 
(the processing). 
2) How to think about the 
message and find the 
right group for doing that. 
3) When you have found the 
message internally within 
your expert group, you 
take the message to the 
trade associations.  
 
P7: “It depends on whether you 
are a lobbyist of a (whole) 
industry or an NGO.” 
 
P6: “A big company has greater 
power to lobby than a smaller 
one. However, the rules are the 
same for all lobbyists, 
organisations or Member States.” 
 
P4: “Many companies have an 
office in Brussels.  This is the 
place where the Advisor would 
be. Like with Nokia.” 
 
P7: “The empirical section of my 
research is concentrated in 
chemical companies, which are 
multinational companies. I think 
that they can be compared to 
Nokia.” 
 
P6: “(Companies) must think how 
they will bring out their own 
opinion. What kind of ideas they 
P4: “You need to clarify the life of 
the marketplace for the policy-
makers. In Brussels, the 
P7: “When I interviewed the 
Heads of European Affairs, I tried 
to ask how much they were 
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have for better regulation, 
regarding e.g. the competitive 
position or improvement of 
internal markets.” 
 
conversion of the messages 
happens there.” 
 
cooperating with other chemical 
companies. Surprisingly little, was 
the answer. If I represented a 
chemical company, I would try to 
create coalitions with others.” 
 
P6: “If the company sees clear 
faults in the existing EU law, for 
example in the case of Nokia, it is 
good to reveal these flaws to the 
Finnish MEPs. This way, when the 
EU laws are made, the fresh ideas 
of the companies are not new (to 
the stakeholders). This is the pre-
lobbying phase, where the 
Parliament is important. This is an 
effective channel to lobby.” 
 
P4: “The groups together have a 
proactive proposal. This can have 
a positive impact and provide a 
better chance for lobbying the 
outcome in the end. In the trade 
associations, it is not always the 
proactive position which wins; 
instead, it is often the scaring or 
slowing down of messages that 
goes forward. In these kinds of 
questions, you have the ones that 
get engaged and the others that 
oppose.” 
 
 
P7: “What came out was an 
organisation named CEFIC. I was 
also in contact with 
BUSINESSEUROPE.” 
 
P6: “The next phase is where the 
EU laws are drafted. This is mainly 
the Commission’s work. However, 
the Parliament’s role should not 
be ignored in this phase either, 
because it can affect the kind of 
preparation that is made.” 
 
P4: “All this (lobbying) should 
happen early in the process. This 
way, the decision-makers who are 
crafting the proposals are 
prepared at least a year in 
advance. Before a proposal is to 
come up, the Commission is 
thinking about it, making 
consultations, outlining different 
options and making impact 
assessments. This is all necessary 
in order to understand the gravity 
P7: “I believe that the thing that 
can be problematic for the 
chemical companies and perhaps 
for Nokia as well is that the 
industry is very specialised. The 
matters that they drive forward 
are extremely detailed.” 
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of the problem. Various 
stakeholder groups, such as the 
civil society and NGOs, are 
involved in the process. The 
member states are particularly 
important, of course, because 
they usually implement the EU 
rules.” 
 
P6: “The companies should be in 
contact with MEPs and specific 
committees. For Nokia, a 
multinational company, this is not 
a problem, since it is not afraid to 
speak in different languages.” 
 
P4: “This is the time to get 
organised, to start collecting all 
kinds of data and evidence that is 
available. This is needed for all 
the policy-makers and the data 
options include impact on society, 
the economy and health issues. 
Part of the data comes from the 
industry or the Commission asks 
for studies from different 
consultancies. During the year, 
there is an evidence collection. It 
is important for companies to be 
part of this in order to submit 
their views, to be part of the 
preparatory stage.” 
 
 
P7: “For me, what has been 
meaningful to discover in the 
interviews and material is that the 
expertise needed for lobbying is 
highly challenging.” 
P6: “Bargaining chips should 
therefore be put forth to the 
Parliament. The Commission is 
clever and looks at the pre-phase 
that has been done for the EU 
lawmaking.” 
P4: “The message is more 
effective when it is done through 
big channels. This gives a better 
impact.”  
 
 
 58 
 
 
P6:  “For companies, it is 
important to understand how the 
EU decision-making is done. This 
is not a problem for Multinational 
Companies that either have the 
know-how to do this or can hire 
expertise.” 
 
P4: “All channels are important in 
that state, to have a coordinated 
position between many 
organisations. This spans the life 
cycle of an Advisor, at least a year 
before the proposal is put in 
place. It is the internal face of the 
company, gradually moving 
towards the trade and industry 
associations and defending the 
position of the industry and 
making your company’s message 
the prevailing one. This is the first 
battle. Also, to simplify the 
message, to tell what is at stake 
for innovation, economic 
development, the environment 
and social environmental 
aspects.”  
 
 
P7: “I read an article of the 
telecommunications industry 
about roaming charges. They had 
asked various stakeholders how 
they see the lobbying of the issue. 
From a lobbyist’s perspective, it is 
difficult to explain to MEPs what 
it is about. To lobbyists, MEPS 
only understand how much one 
costs by x and y amounts. There is 
a targeting problem here, since 
lobbyists seek to lobby but cannot 
turn it into an understandable 
language.” 
P5: “The Commission is the first 
place to lobby. The Commission 
prepares the files before anything 
goes to the EP.”  
 
 
 
P4: “When the proposal comes 
out, you can only do a part of 
them as an Advisor. You can only 
do an x amount of meetings in a 
day; as the audience is broad, you 
need to be part of a bigger effort, 
of companies and organisations 
that convey the same message, 
therefore you have to rely on 
quite a lot of people there.” 
P7: “Nokia can lobby if they are 
able to offer the information that 
policy-makers are missing.” 
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P5: “The Commission listens very 
carefully to all the stakeholders, 
and especially the cabinets are a 
very political and important place 
to lobby.” 
 
P4: “Even when companies have 
an office in Brussels, sometimes 
they hire extra (help) in order to 
be able to cover a bigger audience 
at the same time, because these 
things go on intensely for over a 
year or longer.”  
 
 
“P7: If we think about the EU 
institutions, the European 
Commission appreciates more 
technical knowledge because they 
have to draft a directive or act.” 
P5: “The companies should 
contact the Commission at every 
level. The proposals are prepared 
in the DGs and those are the first 
places to lobby. The cabinets also 
play a very important role.” 
P4: “As an Advisor, you first get 
organised, then discuss the key 
points with your experts about 
what you want to convey. In your 
industry you have a specialised 
language to form the position in 
your industry. The role of the 
Advisor is to push the 
simplification of the message, to 
not let the technical jargon take 
over, otherwise the message will 
be weaker. You have to help the 
policy-makers save time, to get to 
the point very quickly, otherwise 
it will be difficult for them to 
grasp your point.”  
 
 
 P4: “Nokia has followed the 
Parliament for a long time and 
knows the MEPs well, regardless 
whether the matter is about 
copyright or frequency. There is a 
P7: “If you know how to argue 
why something works better, all 
the better.” 
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good amount of MEPs who 
understand the issues, and 
together they construct the 
Parliament’s opinion for these 
matters.”  
 
 P4: “Of course, there is also the 
political element that we must 
take into account. The argument 
must be built within a European 
framework. The companies 
cannot only tell self-serving 
arguments to the MEPs to 
support their own interest, they 
have to emphasise the European 
industry or competitiveness in 
their argument.” 
 
P7: “There is a general 
assumption that the Commission 
needs more technical information 
and MEPs need less. This way it is 
easier for companies to contact 
the Commission and citizen 
organisations. David Coen has 
argued that it is not exactly so. 
Now that the Parliament has 
become an important actor in the 
legislation process, they need 
technical information in a similar 
fashion.” 
 P4: “You must follow the 
Parliament’s agenda; the earlier 
you act, the better. You have to 
find the MEPs that have the 
pencils in their hand. It is 
important for the company to tell 
their view to the media in order 
to make the lobbying easier.” 
P7:  “On the other hand, a 
Commission Official works in a 
certain field. MEPs have to 
understand widely various 
matters. Do they have the 
resources to perceive?” 
 P3:  “The reason why I went to 
Brussels in the beginning is that 
the power of the citizens is 
limited. Member States can of 
course lobby, but when things 
P7: “When one thinks about 
Eurooppanuoret (JEF-FINLAND) 
and Nokia regarding issues such 
as roaming charges, then this is 
perhaps not the place to lobby for 
Eurooppanuoret. However, in 
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start, the role of the Commission 
is very big.” 
 
matters such as the role of NOKIA 
and its position in Finland, it could 
be more useful.” 
 P3: “Our company’s EU relations 
are dealt through our office in 
Brussels.” 
 
P7: “As a Legal Researcher, I am 
interested to look at lobbying, 
which is based on technical 
details, which usually happens 
when the legislation has already 
been drafted. This is the part that 
is least known to us. For this 
reason I am interested in your 
thesis. When the legislation has 
been done, what is the role of 
NOKIA? Is it lobbying through an 
organisation such as DIGITAL 
EUROPE?” 
 
 P3: “We invite different partners 
to Finland to whom we offer data 
on ICT matters. Finland is a good 
example and the Finnish voice 
wants to be heard.” 
 
 
 
 
 P3: “The Estonian Commissioner 
Andrus Ansip has been 
responsible for the EU’s Digital 
Single Market. It helps that he has 
understood the Nordic view.” 
 
 
 
 P3: “The best channel is to be in 
contact with the staff that 
prepares the initiatives.” 
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 P3: “Nokia’s home is in Finland, 
but we are not Finnish. We have a 
strong presence in France and 
Germany. Depending on the 
matter in question, Finland has a 
good lobby in digital matters.” 
 
 
 P3: “For example in roaming 
issues we have a Finnish MEP, 
Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, who 
works with digital and technology 
matters.” 
 
 
 P3: “If we think about the 
preparation of the Council, we 
have the national channels for 
lobbying.” 
 
 
 P3: “Every stakeholder is our 
client, but we see them as specific 
persons. The message of the 
company must be directed to 
everyone. It must be clear and 
right.” 
 
 
 
 P3: “I believe that lobbying is 
producing data and 
understanding this. If we think 
about MEPs, there is a general 
concept that lobbying is 
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something unclear. However, this 
is not true. It is about providing a 
clear message and making good 
policy.” 
 
 
 P3: “Lobbying is about 
communicating.” 
 
 
 P3: “My short experience from 
Brussels is that I have rarely heard 
that there has been too much 
lobbying. On the contrary, the 
political and official staff wants to 
hear opinions.” 
 
 
 P3: “Lobbying is a task and it must 
bring value to the audience, 
which comes on top of the data.” 
 
 
 P2: “Real good decision-making 
can only happen if the 
Commission is well informed. 
They really need to know exactly 
what is happening in the 
industries they want to address. 
The way to do this is to consult 
the players such as businesses.” 
 
 
 P2: “What we (Nokia) do in the 
EU: we are here to see what the 
Commission is developing and we 
inform the company about it. We 
 
 64 
 
try to help the Commission make 
good legislation.” 
 P2: “We want to do good, to be a 
sustainable company. We want to 
be really on top. We want to 
create the best possible results 
for the environment and for 
sustainability.” 
 
 
 P2: “For example, if the 
Commission introduces rules on 
data protection, we want to be 
the best in that particular area 
and accordingly apply principles 
such as accountability.” 
 
 
 P2: “We want to make sure that 
the EU provides common rules 
that make sense.” 
 
 P2: “We use the position papers 
to show our interest and we have 
our own meetings. We meet the 
Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), Political 
Advisors and the Permanent 
Representation of the Member 
States in Brussels.” 
 
 
 P2: “We are part of the most 
important trade associations. This 
is an additional channel for us, 
because it can be more efficient 
to show our interest and it also 
 
 65 
 
provides different points of views 
from others.” 
 
 P2: “It is always good to discuss 
and have a joint position on 
important matters.” 
 
 P2: “The Commission develops 
the initial proposals and therefore 
it is important to talk to them in 
an early stage. This way, lobbying 
is easier.” 
 
 P2: “It is difficult to explain your 
views to a large amount of 
people. That is why you have the 
rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs. You could never talk 
to all the Members of the 
European Parliament. You (have 
to) look for the relevant MEPs in 
your field.” 
 
 
 P1: “Although Nokia was already 
present in almost every EU 
country, the deregulation of the 
telecom markets provided new 
business opportunities. In order 
to follow up more closely on the 
liberalisation of the telecom 
industry, Nokia established its EU 
office in Brussels in 1993, ahead 
of Finland’s membership of the 
EU in 1994.” 
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 P1: “Having an office of your own 
is one of many options when 
lobbying the EU.  Finland's 
Permanent Representation to the 
European Union has many 
experts in various fields. 
European industrial associations 
provide another source of 
information along with a 
possibility to lobby EU 
legislation.” 
 
 P1: “Law firms and consultants 
are available for specific issues. 
The Commission can also be 
approached directly.” 
 
 P1: “However, the legislative 
process in the EU usually takes 
years. Establishing a company 
office in Brussels may therefore 
be justified. It is obviously not the 
cheapest alternative, but – 
combined with other means – it 
may be the most efficient one.” 
 
 P1: “Ideally, for an EU 
representative, it is important to 
know the industry in question, 
the company you work for and 
how the institutions of the EU 
function. A background of 
technical and/or legal studies is 
obviously helpful.” 
 
 P1: “Before opening its office in 
Brussels, Nokia had participated 
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in the EU Research Programme, in 
allocating frequencies on an 
international level in the 
International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) and in setting 
European standards within the 
Standardisation Institute for 
Telecommunications (ETSI).” 
 P1: “A key instrument for the EU 
Office was our large database of 
Commission papers, association 
position papers and other 
relevant documents. We could 
then quickly access and forward 
information.” 
 
 P1: “The EU legislative process 
starts when the Commission 
publishes a draft document they 
call a Green Paper. Interested 
parties are then invited to submit 
comments.” 
 
 P1: “As a rule, the Commission 
does not deal with specific 
company issues. Instead, the 
Commission prefers to receive 
position papers submitted by 
organisations representing 
sectors of industry.”  
 
 
 P1: “To enhance the voice of the 
EU electronics industry, the Nokia 
office was instrumental in 
merging several EU associations 
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for telecom, consumer electronics 
and components into one 
association: The European 
Information and Communication 
Technology Association (EICTA). 
Nokia participated in the board of 
the association and in many 
working groups. EICTA was later 
renamed DIGITAL EUROPE.” 
 P1: “In the 1990s, Finland was 
regarded as the ’laboratory of the 
telecommunication industry.’ 
Hence, Nokia was often consulted 
in various telecom issues.” 
 
 P1: “My role (as an EU 
Representative) was often to find 
the key issue-owners within Nokia 
and get them to participate in 
hearings in Brussels. Nokia also 
prepared a number of written 
opinions.” 
 
 P1: “The Nokia positions were 
regularly discussed at the Head 
Office in meetings with a Future 
Watch Team consisting of experts 
from all divisions.” 
 
 P1: “After a few years in Brussels 
we added another secretary and 
two issue managers to focus on 
copyright matters and consumer 
and environment policy.” 
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ESKO AHO  
 
This event was organised at my university, where I was present.  
Esko Aho has worked for Nokia for many years.  
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AURA SALLA 
 
“Finns cannot lobby in the EU,” says Aura Salla.  
You can read the article at: https://www.talouselama.fi/ 
